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Demographic change causes an undersupply of financial old age benefits within the statutory 
pay-as-you-go pension system in Germany. Therefore, the provision of occupational as well 
as private pensions has to be enhanced. However, there seems to be an undersupply of occu-
pational pension provision particularly in small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Using 
survey data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the German SAVE survey, 
the present paper studies econometrically the determinants of occupational pension provision 
in Germany. It shows that occupational pensions depend not only on supply-side factors such 
as firm size and industry, but also on demand-side factors such as individual socio-demo-
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1. Introduction 
Since the late 1960s, the German population ages while the rate of reproduction is stabilizing 
at a level of 1.4 children per woman. This demographic change results in an undersupply of 
financial old age benefits through the statutory pay-as-you-go pension system, if contribution 
rates to this system and/or retirement age remain constant. Therefore politicians as well as re-
searchers claim that own responsibility for old age income should be enhanced by more use of 
private and occupational pension systems. Also people themselves are not satisfied with their 
financial situation for old age and are willing to place responsibility for financial income on to 
both private and statutory organizations (Wunder and Schwarze 2005, p.25). 
Incentives are set by the state through instruments like tax benefits for both firms and employ-
ees, portability rules or shorter vesting periods. Some researchers recommend a switch from 
the  pay-as-you-go  system  to  the  funding  principle  which  would  be  useful for  each  pillar 
(statutory, occupational and private). An advantage of this capital-based system is that it is 
based on an interpersonal redistribution instead of an intertemporal one. However, a positive 
real interest rate cannot be guaranteed (Krupp and Weeber 2001, Breyer 2000). 
Since January 1
st, 2002, the German occupational pension system via Entgeltumwandlung is 
mandatory for employers if employees ask for it. To save for retirement five pension plan 
types (Durchführungswege) are optional for the employer (BetrAVG §1a I, as amended on 
09.12.2004 (BGBl. I p. 3242)).
1 They allow for three different methods of financing (em-
ployer-based, employee-based or hybrid financed). Up to now, the employer-based system 
has been dominant in Germany, but because of complexity many employers do not provide 
any occupational pension yet or would like to switch to an employee-based system. This re-
sults in an undersupply of occupational old age pensions because employees are not obliged 
to demand such a system. This problem is common also in other countries like the US, UK 
and Norway. Especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) face the problem of un-
dersupply. In descriptive surveys they often name high administration costs and cost of search 
for or information about external suppliers and their offered range of products as an obstacle 
for providing an occupational pension. 
Economic research still misses to explain econometrically the incidence of occupational pen-
sions in Germany. The purpose of this paper therefore is to evaluate the determinants of the 
observed gap in occupational pension provision between German firms. We first formulate 
hypotheses on supply and demand for occupational pensions and provide an overview of re-
cent literature in section 2. In section 3, the hypotheses will be examined econometrically on 
                                                 
1 BetrAVG = Law on the Improvement of Company Pensions. Pension plan types are: book reserve schemes 
(Direktzusage), direct insurance (Direktversicherung), Pensionskasse, support fund (Unterstützungskasse), and 
pension fund (Pensionsfonds).   2
the basis of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the German SAVE survey. Fi-
nally, section 4 concludes and gives an outlook on future research. 
 
2.  Overview of Previous Research  
2.1 Stylized Facts 
Several analyses based on surveys showed that a gap in pension provision between SMEs and 
large firms was an apparent phenomenon in Germany, the US, UK and Norway. Some of 
these found significant differences across lines of business. 
In Germany, most of the interviewed people state that they do not believe the statutory pen-
sion system to be effective enough to provide money for old age. Individual retirement in-
come by statutory pension paybacks won’t be sufficient to hold the standard of living. How-
ever, many of them do not seem to be adequately informed about this issue. The same applies 
to employers. More than 75% of them are not aware of the fact that they are obliged to pro-
vide their employees a system of deferred compensation (R+V 2004, p.5). Most of the authors 
identify a gap between SMEs and large firms in pension provision, as well as between Eastern 
and Western Germany (Kortmann and Haghiri 2005, Müller 2004, R+V 2004). 
An amazing result of the surveys is people’s unsatisfactory willingness to save additional 
money for retirement. It can be explained by the fact that the lower people’s incomes the 
lower are their savings for retirement as these employees are liquidity constraint (Huberman 
et al. 2007, p. 27/28, Reifner et al. 2003, p.19/20). This is the case in Germany as the social 
security system offers poor and unemployed people the possibility to receive a fix transfer 
income (Sozialhilfe) which does not enable people to make payments to an occupational sys-
tem dependent on income. 
New findings in those surveys are provided by answers to the questions why people want to 
participate in a pension plan and why they reject participation. 
The most often named arguments to enhance demand are advice by and competence of the 
consultant or the employer. Employees are aware that they are not able to inform themselves 
about recent developments or statutory advancements. Therefore they expect consultants to 
act as information intermediaries. If this criterion is fulfilled properly employees demand an 
occupational pension plan (HDI PM 2005, p.20/21, R+V 2004, p.6). 
People are more likely to demand a pension plan if they realize that their employer feels so-
cial responsibility
2 or wants to increase motivation and corporate identification. In most cases 
of pension rejection, employees are not interested in retirement provision, because they think 
the offered system is too risky, the benefits from the statutory pension system are overesti-
                                                 
2 This is a modern substitute for employee retention.   3
mated, or they will not have enough money left to save. Sometimes, employees also fear to 
ask their employer for a plan (HDI PM 2005, Müller 2004, Delta Lloyd 2004).
3 
Similar  results  are  found  by  other  authors  who  evaluated  whether mobility  of  employees 
served as an additional factor of influence (see table 1). 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Additionally, Gustman et al. (1994) mention that mobility is affected by employee’s current 
wage and their potential capital loss. Rabe (2004) and Andrietti (2001) prove this argument 
for several European countries. 
As Germany, countries like the US, UK, and Norway face the following problems: low par-
ticipation rates in private or occupational pension systems and less retirement plan provision 
in SMEs than in large companies. A commonly named reason for this is: young employees 
and those with low income reject a participation in an occupational plan. Individual reasons 
are different (Ghilarducci and Lee 2005, Hinz and Turner 1998, Even and Macpherson 1994). 
Moreover, it has been shown that long job tenures are the result of offered pension plans 
(Mealli and Pudney 1996). Finally, despite 401(k) plans
4 which are popular in the US and do 
not have excessive administration cost, particularly SMEs reject pension plan provision. All 
these results show that pension gaps between SMEs and large firms are an important policy 
point at present in various countries. 
The studies for Germany named above remain on a descriptive level to show the development 
of occupational pension plan supply and demand. It is therefore necessary to show economet-
rically which determinants have a statistically significant impact on pension plan provision. 
To fill this gap, we derive several hypotheses from economic theory in the following chapter. 
 
2.2  Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Given the gaps in the provision of pension plans by the statutory pension system, reasons as 
to why people demand a certain category of pension need to be evaluated.  
Mitchell (1988) notes that employees make up suboptimal decisions concerning their pension 
plans as they are imperfectly informed about tax deference, different channels to choose and 
other plan characteristics. She mentions a divergence of efforts on employee and employer 
side due to the fact that employees have different incentives to ask for a plan. Employers are 
                                                 
3 These surveys include only answers from employees, unemployed are left out as they are not able to make 
payments to an occupational pension system during their period of unemployment. Self-employed people are 
excluded in most cases because their savings for old age can be added to private pension provision. 
4 401(k) plans are used in the US as a hybrid financed instrument of deferred compensation with an option for 
the employee to opt out of this system. This way employees are permitted to benefit from current tax deferrals on 
current wages (Kusko et al. 1998 among others). A short discussion of 401(k) plans can be found in Munnell and 
Sundén (2006).   4
more likely to offer a plan if the firm is profitable. An equilibrium between demand by em-
ployees and supply by employers could be achieved only if we lived in a world without in-
formation cost.  
Several authors identified parameters influencing a person’s individual decision to participate 
in an occupational pension plan subject to the assumption that employers offer some. What 
reasons do arise for the demand for and supply of occupational pensions? Economic literature 
developed different hypotheses to explain influences on both employee side and employer 
side. The first three arguments refer mainly to supply side factors, although a clear separation 
between supply side and demand side is not possible. 
First, pension systems could act as a mechanism of employee retention. This may be in the 
interest of both employees and employers. Participation in a plan implies that the employer 
saves  a  certain  amount  of  money  for  the  employee’s  retirement  period.  Either  the  same 
amount of money is saved as a wage deferral (defined contribution) every period or the em-
ployee is being paid out a fixed pension amount at the beginning of the retirement period (de-
fined benefit). Gustman and Steinmeier (1993) show that defined contribution plans are more 
portable and therefore associated with higher employee turnover than defined benefit plans as 
a new employer only needs to pay defined contributions to the employee without having to 
guarantee the final amount of pensions from a defined benefit plan. Taylor (2000, p. 248/249) 
supports this hypothesis for the UK and notes that especially defined benefit plans keep em-
ployees from leaving a company. Some authors (for example Krahnen 1990, p. 200/201) call 
benefit plans a sponsoring mechanism of employers due to the fact that the employees’ con-
tributions are save for retirement and therefore act as a backloading mechanism by providing 
debt capital from inside of the firm. By funding a pension, the employer receives a credit from 
the employee which will be paid back when the latter retires. Contributions by the employee 
are disposed by the firm for the whole period of saving and thus stay within the company. 
Under uncertainty about possible insolvency of the firm and the risk premium they have to 
pay  workers are not able to work as creditors. However, the employee is likely to loose the 
compound interest rate if he or she quits the job before retirement and changes to another em-
ployer. Then a new pension with a lower capital stock has to be built up there (Dorsey et al. 
1998, Ippolito 1997, Kotlikoff and Wise 1985, Lazear and Moore 1984).
5 A further argument 
of matching the interests of employer and employee is made by Backes-Gellner and Pull 
(1999) who claim that the provision of a benefit in retirement periods is efficient if employees 
consider benefits to be better than the monetary equivalent at present. This supports the find-
                                                 
5 In Germany this mechanism depends on the arrangement between employer and employee. The German law 
(§1b BetrAVG) guarantees the repayment of contributions to a pension system if the employee is older than 30 
years or the entitlement exists for at least five years when the employee changes the job.   5
ing of Mitchell (1988) that it is better to inform employees about pension benefits and thus 
increase individual action to insure themselves for old age. 
A second argument that is closely related to the hypothesis of employee retention is based on 
Lazear (1979). He shows that employees are able to realize the individual benefit amount of a 
pension  plan.  Therefore  they  avoid  shirking  before  retirement.  This  is  due  to  efficiency 
wages: employees earn lower wages than their marginal product of labor at younger age and 
higher wages when they get older. So employer and employee build up an implicit contract. 
An anticipated capital loss evoked by job loss because of shirking leads to a reduction of em-
ployee mobility. Otherwise people would look for a job in which they are not offered a pen-
sion. Moreover, the avoidance of shirking may have the additional effect of decreasing train-
ing costs and the costs of finding and recruiting new staff as employees have an incentive to 
work harder and have a longer tenure (McCarthy 2006, Allen et al. 1993). An impact on mo-
tivation and loyalty by fringe benefits or occupational pensions could be proved for the US 
(Allen et al. 1993) but not for Germany (Frick et al. 1999). Our first hypothesis therefore is 
 
H1: A longer tenure in a firm goes along with higher motivation. As motivation is enhanced 
by occupational benefits there is a positive relationship between the probability of adopting a 
pension and tenure. 
 
The third argument refers to economies of scale achieved by large firms. If a firm employed a 
large number of employees it could offer a pension plan that required possibly higher fixed 
costs of administrative expenses.
6 So, the costs per employee decrease with firm size. Fur-
thermore, large firms have a higher probability to survive business cycle fluctuations and are 
more able to earn extra money to pay for higher pensions. A small firm would not be able to 
pay a pension if it went bankrupt. The risk of becoming insolvent is higher for small firms 
than for large firms. Furthermore, a case of death or invalidity could result in high payments, 
which reduce cash-flow and may cause insolvency, if the employer did not save enough for an 
event like that. This risk is higher for small firms than for large firms because large firms are 
more able to calculate the probability of a sudden case of death. Finally, economies of scale 
and bankruptcy risk differ across lines of business (Horiba and Yoshida 2002, Aoki 1984, 
Mitchell and Andrews 1981). 
This leads us to two further hypotheses: 
H2: Large companies are more likely to offer a pension plan than small companies. 
H3: The demand for occupational pension plans differs across lines of business and regions. 
 
                                                 
6 Administration costs differ across ways of pension provision. Thus, Dorsey (1987) provides empirical evidence 
that firms with low monitoring costs like small companies are more likely to offer defined contribution plans 
whereas large firms offer defined benefits more often.   6
From the view of human capital theory we have to add that people who are offered a pension 
plan, who are well informed and stay longer at a firm tend to be more productive than others. 
The reason for this is that employees acquire firm-specific human capital that as a result in-
creases firm productivity (Becker 1964, Andrietti and Patacchini 2004, p.2). This could not be 
rejected for the US (Cornwell and Dorsey 2000). 
As Mitchell (1988) points out educated employees and women are better informed about de-
tails of pension plans as they are more likely to be involved in the process of getting informa-
tion about pension determinants. Bernstein (2002, p. 2065) supports this argument by pointing 
out that educated people are better aware of tax reductions which are related to pension plans 
and other types of fringe benefits, therefore we develop hypothesis 4. 
 
H4: As female and well educated people are better informed, they know better about the ad-
vantages of occupational pensions and therefore have a higher probability of participating in 
a plan. 
 
Mincer (1976) tested several sociodemographic factors (like schooling, hours worked, gender) 
and their influence on individual income. We suggest that these factors influence retirement 
income too, as Blundell et al. (1994) found out that demographic attributes and labor market 
variables  significantly  influence  intertemporal  behavior.  Freeman  (1985)  additionally  uses 
information about labor union membership based on the model of union monopoly power and 
its collective voice, showing both theoretically and empirically that it has a positive influence 
on pension plan demand. Further empirical evidence on the impact of labor unions on labor 
compensation by cash wages and fringe benefits is provided by Long and Scott (1982). Besi-
des, Gustman et al. (1994) argue that mobility is affected not only by the employee’s current 
wage, but also by the capital loss occurred from a job change. 
Thus, we expect: 
 
H5: The demand for occupational pension plans depends on sociodemographic attributes (e.g. 
income, age, marital status, position, and number of children). 
H6: Savings motives based on individual circumstances influence the willingness to provide 
for retirement. 
 
These hypotheses shall be tested in the following chapter.  7
3.  Empirical analysis 
3.1 Data 
The  data  used  in  this  study  have  been  taken  from  the  German  Socio  Economic  Panel 
(GSOEP) and the German SAVE survey. The GSOEP is an annual survey among German 
individuals with questions concerning several socioeconomic factors with every wave focus-
ing on a special topic. From 1985 to 1995 questions concerning occupational pensions were 
asked. Thus, the most recent data available refer to 1995.
7 The dataset of our analysis contains 
13768 people who were asked to participate in the survey.
8 The answers to the questions 
about occupational pension coverage are displayed in table 2. As shown in the first column, in 
1995 almost 2000 people in our dataset worked in a firm that offered a pension plan, but only 
1392 of them (73%) were entitled in a plan (see second column). It is an astonishing fact that 
16% of those who answered the question “In some companies the employees are offered a 
company pension in addition to social security. Does your company offer this for all or some 
of its employees?” did not know whether their firm offered a pension plan. This is a hint to an 
undersupply of information inside firms as a lot of people are not aware of their possibility to 
make retirement provisions. Moreover, 87.8% of the people considered in this study are not 
entitled in plans from an earlier employer. This could possibly be due to the fact that the mean 
age of people owning an occupational pension is 41.7 years. People of this age are more likely 
to be bound to the firm than younger employees who are more career-minded. 35.7% of the 
total number of employees entitled in an occupational pension plan are female, and 64.3% of 
them are male. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Another possible reason for the apparent low mobility might be that before 2002 the portabil-
ity  and  vesting  rules  had  been  more  restrictive  and  more  complex.  The  rules  concerning     
vesting periods are a popular example
9: 
An employee participating in an occupational pension plan keeps his entitlements if he leaves 
the firm before occurrence of an insured event only if he is at least 35 years old and either the 
pension promise exists for at least 10 years or the employee is employed at that firm for at 
least 12 years and his pension promise exists for at least 3 years (BetrAVG §1 I 1, as amended 
                                                 
7 Due to a small number of answers in earlier waves and therefore resulting small variance in the dataset we con-
centrate our analysis on the year 1995 and compare the results to those of the year 2005 based on the German 
SAVE survey. As the “Riester-pension” had been introduced in 2001 we are not able to evaluate a relationship 
between Riester pension and occupational pensions in 1995.  
8 The number of answers differs between the different parts of the questionnaire. For a detailed description of the 
survey see Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005). 
9 The BetrAVG has been revised several times and legislators tried to simplify the rules but in some cases like 
vesting and portability it is still complex due to several exceptions.   8
on 05.10.1994 (BGBl. I p. 2911)). After exclusion of self-employed people from our analysis 
31%  of  those  who  are  subordinates  in  a  small  firm  do  not  own  an  occupational  pension 
whereas almost 85% of those employed at a large firm (2000 and more) have claims in a pen-
sion system.
10 This can be seen from table 3.
11 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Concerning hypothesis 5 derived above, our dataset suggests that people with higher wages
12 
have a higher probability to participate in an occupational pension scheme. To show this we 
took the quartiles of individual income and related them to firm size with respect to the fact 
that the person owns a claim in occupational pensions. Table 4 points out that in our dataset 
most people with high income are employed in large firms, which refers to the thesis that 
large firms achieve economies of scale in administration costs. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
On a descriptive basis no clear answer can be given on the question about the relation be-
tween education and pension coverage. 81% of those with a university degree are entitled in a 
pension plan but almost 83% of those with no university degree as qualification for their cur-
rent job are entitled in a pension plan, too.
13 Besides socio-economic attributes the GSOEP 
contains questions on people’s savings behavior as well as attitudes towards assets, income 
and life satisfaction. Therefore we include these variables in our analyses to control for an in-
fluence of psychological factors. 
In order to find out whether people’s attitude towards pension plan adoption changed during 
the past ten years we use the German SAVE survey that includes both socio-economic attrib-
utes and questions on people’s savings behavior, attitudes towards assets and income, too. 
The survey started in 2001 and the second wave followed in 2003. The third wave we use, 
including 2305 households, was collected in summer 2005.
14 The weights used on the multi-
variate level are based on the distribution of income and age of the German sample census of 
the respective year.
15 
                                                 
10 19 self-employed people are excluded from this part of our analysis. 
11 SMEs can be defined differently: Some use yearly turn-over or total assets. The EU defines SMEs up to a 
number of 250 employees. Deviating from this we define in our dataset SMEs due to the data structure from less 
than 5 employees to an upper limit of 200 employees. 
12 We approximate wages by using average monthly household income. 
13 On the multivariate level weights based on a person level projection factor defined as the inverse of the cor-
rected probability to be drawn (korrigierte Ziehungswahrscheinlichkeit) are used. 
14 More detailed information on the composition of the dataset and its methodological aspects can be found in 
Schunk (2006a) and Schunk (2006b). 
15 In contrast to the GSOEP the SAVE dataset does not contain information on lines of business or firm size. 
Therefore, we are not able to estimate whether substantial differences in pension coverage exist across lines of 
business or firm sizes between year 1995 and 2005.   9
In times of demographic change with a decreasing amount of money paid to retirees by the 
statutory pension system it could be useful for those who believe to have an above-average 
life expectancy to provide for old age via occupational pensions. These may care for them-
selves as they would be extremely influenced by lower payoffs and could possibly face old 
age poverty. The SAVE data show on a descriptive basis that only 15.0 (8.5) percent of those 
expecting to live longer than an average person use occupational (private) pension plans to fill 
their individual gap in financial benefits. But there is still the question whether supposed life 
expectancy has a statistically significant influence on individual pension plan demand. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that people participating in private pension plans may value 
these as a substitute for occupational pensions. The SAVE dataset shows that 19.3 percent of 
those participating in an occupational pension plan have a private pension as well and 8.3 per-
cent of those not having an occupational pension have a private pension instead (see table 7). 
It is amazing that more than 90 percent of those not participating in occupational plans do not 
provide for old age on their own.
16 Calculated with reference to the whole survey we see that 
79% of all people participating in the SAVE survey care neither privately nor occupationally 
for old age. Therefore the descriptive statistics do not support the argument of occupational 
and private pensions being substitutes. 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
A closer look has to be taken on the multivariate level. To test the above hypotheses, we will 
do the following estimations.
17 
 
3.2 Estimation method 
We use data consisting of all male and female employees who hold claims in occupational 
pensions either at the actual employer or at a former employer or not at all.
18  
First we estimate the probability P of an individual person i (or a firm) owning (offering) an 
occupational pension (Y = 1) in terms of a vector of socioeconomic attributes Xi. As the result-
ing dependent variable is a binary one we have to estimate a binary probit model underlying 
the assumption of a cumulative standard normal distribution function which can be written as 
                                                 
16 A possible explanation might be a misunderstanding in the questionnaire: Many people who participate in this 
survey might not have a usual product which could be counted as a private or occupational way of pension pro-
vision. But in 1995 almost 9 million households (almost 2.3 million households at the age of 40-50 years) in 
Germany were owners of a flat or a house which can be counted as a way to provide for old age (source: GSOEP 
1995). This might be due to the fact that real estate (or reverse mortgage) as a mechanism to provide for retire-
ment becomes more and more popular now but had not been regarded that way in 1995. The same argument ap-
plies to life insurances. 
17 The importance of micro-level data for demand analysis compared to aggregate data has been evaluated and 
discussed by Blundell et al. (1993). 
18 Those who answered “don’t know” will be treated as missing.   10
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with I* incorporating an unobservable utility index
19 of individual i and t being a standardized 
normal variable t ~ N (0,1). 
   
As the utility index I is being defined as  i i i i X P F I F I 2 1
1 1 ) ( ) ( β β + = = =
− −
 it can be esti-
mated econometrically as (2) with ui being the error term 
i i i u X I + + = 2 1 β β .                                                      (2) 
Socioeconomic attributes included in vector  i X  of individual i are:  
Variable  Definition  Expected sign 
OPi  dummy  variable  equal  to  1  if  individual  i  acquires 
claims of an occupational pension or (in a second set 
up) if a firm offers individual i a pension plan  
Dep. var. 
TENi  tenure (years) of employee i at his current employer  + 
FIRMSIZE  vector of dummy variables for the number of employees 








REGIONi  dummy variable equal to 1 if individual i lives in West-
ern Germany  
+ 
GENDERi  dummy variable equal to 1 if person i is male   + 
EDUi  dummy variable equal to 1 if individual i needed a uni-
versity degree to get his or her job
21 
+ 
INCi  total net monthly income of all household members per-
son i is the head of  
+ 
MARITALi  dummy variable equal to 1 if individual i is married  + 
AGEi  age (years) of person i  + 
FOPi  dummy variable equal to 1 if person i owns an occupa-
tional pension from a former employer 
+ 
POSITIONi  dummy variable equal to 1 if individual i is a blue-collar 
worker  
- 
CHILDi  dummy variable equal to 1 if there are children under 
age 16 living in the household of individual i,  
in 2005 it is the number of children under 16 living in 
the household of individual i 
- 
MOTIVEi  vector  of  variables  including  dummy  variables  on 
whether  person i  expects  to  live  longer  than  average, 
whether i owns a Riester pension and whether i owns a 
private pension (except  Riester), as well as questions on 
Life expectancy + 
Unemployment – 
Standard of living + 
Econ. situation + 
                                                 
19 This is what Gujarati (1995) names a critical value in decision making.  
20 D1: less than 5 employees, D2: 5-19, D3: 20-199, D4: 200-1999, D5: 2000 and more 
21 For 1995 we used EDU as proxy for education of individual i because data are not available. This way we are 
able to catch up time preferences as those who do longer benefit from educational services in order to earn 
higher wages in future have a small time preference. Therefore they are less likely to demand pensions or other 
forms of savings (see for example Börsch-Supan (2001) and Rodepeter (1997) among others).   11
the degree of risk to become unemployed, on satisfac-
tion with the individual economic and financial situation 
and on the standard of living. 
Riester pension – 
Private pension - 
 
Therefore the structural part of the regression can be written as (3) 
i i i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i
u MOTIVE CHILD POSITION FOP
AGE MARITAL INC EDU GENDER
REGION INDUSTRY FIRMSIZE TEN OP
+ + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + + =
13 12 11 10
9 8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
α α α α
α α α α α
α α α α α
            (3) 
 
Afterwards we evaluated what attributes significantly influenced the duration of claims in oc-
cupational pensions. Therefore, we did OLS estimations using the same socioeconomic at-
tributes like in equation (3) but with the logarithm of duration (years) of claims in occupa-
tional pensions as the dependent variable and the log of income and age as independent vari-
ables. 
We  also  tried  to  estimate  determinants  of  the  supply  of  an  occupational  pension  on  firm 
side.
22 However, due to insufficient attributes of the firms that supply an occupational pension 
to their employees these regressions could be improved if more firm specific attributes were 
available.
23 All observations have been weighted in our multivariate analyses.
 The estimated 
coefficients of binary and limited variables can not be interpreted as marginal effects but the 
direction of the effect can be deduced from the estimated sign of the coefficient. However, the 




Our estimation results reported in table 6 and table 7 provide insights into the German occu-
pational pension system and people’s pension plan adoption.
24 
[Table 6 about here] 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
To start with the supply side of our analysis we did regressions on the impact of firm-specific 
variables influencing the supply of a pension plan by a company (see model 1). It can be 
shown that income (as a proxy for wages paid) has a negative influence on pension plan sup-
                                                 
22 To do this we used firm-specific information provided by the individual answers of those participating in the 
GSOEP. 
23 An econometric study on the supply of an occupational pension in Lower Saxony has been carried out by 
Schnabel and Wagner (1999). 
24 The results of our sensitivity analyses are robust to changes in specifications. The highest explanatory power is 
represented by the reported model specifications. Stepwise inclusion of the reported exogenous variables and 
comparisons of the results for the single coefficients and the overall test statistics delivered the models named 
above.    12
ply which might be caused by the amount of contributions as a percentage of individual sala-
ries an employer has to pay.
25 Furthermore, we identify statistically significant differences 
between firm sizes. Firms with a small number of employees (no more than 20) do less often 
offer an occupational pension plan than firms with more than 2000 employees compared to 
the reference group.
26 Across lines of business we identified statistically significant differ-
ences, too. Financial intermediaries and manufacturing firms are more likely to provide a pen-
sion system than firms of the reference group. 
Based on model 2 to 5 which give reference to the question whether people demand a pen-
sion plan and how long they acquire claims from it we are able to point out the following. 
Model 2 to model 4 can be used to compare the pension plan demand in 1995 (model 2) with 
that of 2005 (model 3 and 4). We chose model 3 and 4 to test whether the existence of the Ri-
ester pension has a certain impact on pension provision behavior that differs from that of peo-
ple who have another form of private pension. Model 2 shows that provision behavior in 1995 
is less motivated by personal attributes but caused by firm characteristics. As model 3 and 4 
make  evident  in  2005  individual  factors  and  subjective  attitudes  become  more  important. 
Household income in 1995 does not have the expected positive and (highly) significant influ-
ence on the dependent variables as proposed by H5. It seems as if people with a higher house-
hold income do not care as much for future incomes. It supports Blinder (1982, p. 30-32) who 
claims that pensions are imperfect substitutes for wages. In 2005 the sign of household in-
come changes to the expected positive influence on the adoption of a pension plan. People 
who earn higher wages are more able to provide for the future. Furthermore, the impact of age 
is statistically highly significant in both years which indicates that older people are aware of 
the fact that they should prepare for their retirement age. The influence of marital status is 
only predictable for 2005. Therefore it cannot be concluded that single adults seem to be less 
accountable for others and therefore care less for them. Married have a statistically significant 
higher probability to participate in a plan in 2005. The influence of being a man is not signifi-
cant so that it is not possible to reject or confirm the hypothesis of women being better in-
formed than men and therefore having a higher probability to adopt a pension. Given that our 
analyses include only working men and women this argument needs to be taken carefully. For 
the UK Johnson et al. (1998) find that marital status and gender are most important for the 
likelihood to have claims in an occupational pension plan.
27 
                                                 
25 An inclusion of other firm-specific factors (like turnover, firm age or education of the firm owner) could en-
able us to draw more concrete conclusions on pension plan supply from employer side but due to data shorten-
ings we are not able to do that. 
26 It would be interesting to evaluate whether the age of a company has a statistically significant impact on the 
supply of an occupational pension plan. 
27 A closer description of female pension coverage (especially for the UK) can by found in Gough (2004) who 
names for example gaps in employment, lack of pension portability, expectation of the partner to provide for old   13
On the contrary, it can neither in 1995 nor in 2005 be stated that those who are supposed to be 
highly educated (people having a university degree) provide less for old age by the second 
pillar. We are not able to find evidence for a significant impact of the education variable. A 
possible reason for this result might be that young, high-skilled employees, who are more ca-
reer-minded, neglect old age pension provision because they want to be more mobile, and are 
not willing to bind themselves to a company facing reductions in the capital stock if they 
change jobs. Besides this, high skilled employees might possibly use the third pillar (private 
pensions) as a substitute for occupational pensions because fewer problems like restricted 
portability  occur  there.
28  To  control  for  this  with  the  data  of  2005  we  use  two  variables      
(Riester pension
29 and private pension) that include information about the individuals’ attitude 
towards private pension provision. In 2005, both the ownership of a Riester pension or an-
other private pension has a statistically significant positive influence which is against the 
opinion that private pensions are substitutes for occupational pensions.  It seems  as if the 
chance to care occupationally is higher for those who provide for old age privately as well 
because they are better informed about the need to save. As both employed men and em-
ployed women are included in our analysis it cannot be stated that typically men act as the 
head of the household and therefore care more for their family. To have children under age 16 
living in the household based on the argument of care does not have a statistically significant 
impact on adoption or duration of claims. But the larger the number of children an individual 
has in 2005 the less he or she provides for old age. A popular argument for this is that families 
need to spend money to care for their family and therefore have less money left to save. Fur-
thermore, if people own a plan from a former employer they are more likely to have a plan at 
their current employer as they seem to be informed about their possibilities and show the will-
ingness to care for retirement income. 
Therefore, H4 can neither be rejected nor confirmed. 
Model 5 shows that, besides the arguments named above, being employed as a blue-collar 
worker does not have a clearly identified influence on both pension plan adoption and dura-
tion of plans. Additionally, with tenure being statistically highly significant in model 2 we are 
not able to reject H1. People who plan to care for retirement income seem to be aware of the 
                                                                                                                                                          
age, no willingness to reduce income etc. as reasons for not having rights in a pension plan. Guariglia and Mar-
kose (2000) do panel estimations for the UK whether differences in savings behaviour across genders occur. 
28 In our study we are not able to control for this possibility as the people participating in the GSOEP have only 
been asked questions about private provision in 2002. The SAVE dataset we use to control for changes during 
the past ten years includes answers on private pension provision. 
29 The Riester pension had been introduced in 2001 by the German ministry of labor and social affairs with the 
aim to support especially people of lower income levels. Therefore people demanding this product are offered 
support by tax deferrals.   14
fact that they need to profit from the compound interest effect and therefore are willing and 
motivated to stay longer at an employer and hold a pension. 
Like Mitchell and Andrews (1981), who were able to show differences across lines of busi-
ness and regions for the US we find both industry and regional effects for Germany which can 
be identified clearly.
30 People employed in Western Germany are both in 1995 and 2005 sta-
tistically more probable to be included in a plan due to historical effects. Besides, people from 
Eastern Germany might have a different attitude towards financial old age provision as they 
could rely more on state activity. The economic development of each region and its influence 
on firms may play an important role because those firms that face a positive economic devel-
opment are more likely to provide a pension plan due to a higher ability to fund them. Differ-
ences in sector-specific demand and supply for occupational pensions may be related to the 
historical background, too. In construction, sales, hotels and restaurants it has not been com-
mon in history to provide pension plans. Another possible reason might be that people em-
ployed in sectors like farming and construction have a lower mean tenure than employees in 
other sectors (see table 8). Therefore they are less likely to provide for old age as they might 
need to rebuild the capital stock. An argument for the positive sign of financial intermediaries 
might be that this line of business is one of the external intermediaries to offer pension prod-
ucts. They may use their advantages in information and should therefore be aware of the need 
to prevent. 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
Furthermore, as model 2 points out firm size is an important factor. We find out that a small 
supply in pension plans occurs in small firms. People employed in firms with 5 to 19 employ-
ees have a significantly lower probability to participate in an occupational pension plan and a 
lower duration of plans than firms employing 2000 and more employees. This can be ex-
plained by scale economies and the fact that large firms are more likely to have a historical 
background in plan provision. Furthermore, large firms are more likely to survive business 
cycle fluctuations and therefore are more willing to provide a pension plan. The dimension of 
payments depends on the duration of the plan. 
Thus, we cannot reject hypotheses H2 and H3. 
To control for different attitudes towards saving we include variables that are supposed to 
capture the current situation of living, risks and other savings motives in our analyzes for 
1995 and 2005. 
The estimation results make evident that in either case H6 cannot be rejected. People make up 
different minds on their current standard of living. For 2005 we find evidence that the more 
                                                 
30 This may be determined by the number of observations in each category and the resulting variance.   15
they are satisfied with their economic situation and their standard of living the more likely 
they are to save for retirement as they want to keep it. This could not be deduced for 1995. 
Contrary to our assumptions the risk to become unemployed does not have a statistically sig-
nificant impact. Neither in 1995 nor in 2005 after the crash of the “New Economy” with an 
increasing number of unemployed people do people save more for retirement if the subjective 
risk of becoming unemployed rises. If people expect to have a longer life expectancy they are 
more likely to participate in a pension plan which is some evidence that over time information 
about financial problems at old age arising from demographic change enhanced. Theses peo-
ple tend to be aware of the need to prevent more than by mandatory social security programs. 
Summarizing, we find that individual income, marital status, age and being occupied in a 
small or large firm have a huge impact on the decision of a person to stay in a pension plan 
and to save for a longer period. This is supported by different savings motives. Differences 
across lines of business could not be identified clearly across all models.
31 
 
4.  Conclusion  
Currently pension savings decrease in large companies. Others underestimate the costs arising 
from offering a pension plan to employees. In most cases a decrease is caused by a large posi-
tion of pensions in the balance sheet which causes worse ratings with the result of worse con-
ditions for receiving credits. Therefore, rating agencies ask companies to use pension funds or 
other instruments to reduce internal pension savings. Besides, companies offer pensions to 
their workforce by several aims (e.g. economic reasons, motive of foresight, responsibility for 
the workforce). Therefore it is important to evaluate what people look like who adopt an oc-
cupational pension. In this analysis we have shown that differences exist both across SMEs 
and large firms as well as across regions using econometric methods. Our results are sup-
ported by other descriptive studies carried out for Germany which indicate that a gap between 
different firm sizes occurs. We point out that pension plan provision differs across lines of 
business. These results are in line with theoretical and empirical literature which arguments 
that employees with low income as well as young employees seem to face information prob-
lems concerning the necessity to provide for old age. Besides information problems young 
people might have a higher discount rate than older people and prefer to spend more money 
on consumption and do not care for old age. Less provision by single adults and people with 
                                                 
31 An analysis for the composition of a pension plan portfolio has been carried out by Domínguez-Barrero and 
López-Laborda (2007) for Spain. By estimating the influence of different factors on the amount of contributions 
to different kinds of pension plans they reach results that are similar to ours. 
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children could not be identified in 1995 but in 2005 people’s provision for old age decreases 
with the number of children. 
Concerning information differences across individuals it would be interesting to investigate 
the effects of individual labor union membership. Labor unions are able to collect and pool 
information and afterwards pass it to their members. Furthermore they have a huge impact on 
wage discussions as well as on the offer of fringe benefits. Therefore, labor unions are sup-
posed to have a greater impact on pension provision as has been shown by other authors for 
the US. Besides, the willingness to participate in an occupational pension plan could be de-
pendent on individual payments to the statutory pension system. It could thus be expected that 
those paying small amounts to the statutory system are aware of not receiving large paybacks 
at retirement age and do hence demand occupational plans. Even a distinction between de-
fined benefit and defined contribution plans and the way of financing these plans could have 
an effect on provision behavior. But due to data limitations we have not been able to examine 
this. 
Important determinants of saving for retirement are individual attitudes and satisfaction with 
the standard of living. This has been measured by several variables. The more satisfied people 
are at present the more they want to keep it in future and therefore care more for retirement. 
According to Terry and White (1998, p. 25) management aspects concerning occupational 
pensions are of importance as employers should inform their employees about future short-
falls in public pension systems and the need to prevent more. To eliminate the named gaps 
further research needs to be done on questions concerning the possibility for the state to set 
incentives for both employers and employees to adopt a pension scheme and improve infor-
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Table 1: Survey of studies on job mobility and occupational pensions 
 





























UK  USA  USA  USA 
Young em-






due to the will 
to get ahead 
Mobility varies 




























serves as a 
mechanism 
of selfselec-









Source: own creation 





Table 2: Answers to questions about supply and claims of occupational pensions  
(percentages in parentheses) 
 
 
supply by a company 
 
 




claims from earlier employer 
 
Yes  1941 (24.16)  1392 (73.15)  467 (5.85) 
No  4778 (59.47)  305 (16.03)  7009 (87.78) 
Don’t know  1315 (16.37)  206 (10.82)  509 (6.37) 
total  8034 (100)  1903 (100)  7985 (100) 
Note: This table includes self-employed people. Later on, they will be left out of our analysis, because most other stud-
ies attribute occupational pensions of self-employed people to the private pillar. 
Source: own calculations based on GSOEP, wave 12 (1995)  
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Table 3: Percentage of claims in terms of firm size 
   
Claims in a pension plan 
Firm size  no (in %)  yes (in %) 
 < 5 to < 20 employees  31.09  68.91 
  20 to < 200 employees  20.47  79.53 
200 to < 2000 employees  16.73  83.27 
2000 and more employees  15.38  84.62 
Note: due to the fact that not all participants in the GSOEP answered questions on pension provision and other financial 
aspects for different reasons the numbers especially for people who answered “yes” and who are employed in the small-
est category of firms might be too large. 





Table 4: Number of pension participants with respect to income and firm size 
  Firm size (measured by number of employees) 
Income quartiles  Below 5  5 to < 20  20 to < 200  200 to < 2000  > 2000 
1
st quartile  7  10  23  21  34 
2
nd quartile  2  19  37  57  39 
3
rd quartile  5  15  71  114  143 
4
th quartile  6  23  84  196  354 
total  20  67  215  388  570 





Table 5: Private versus occupational pensions (percentages in parentheses) 
    Private pension 
    no  yes 
no  1662 (91.7)  150 (8.3) 
Occupational pension  yes  234 (80.7)  56 (19.3) 
Source: own calculations based on SAVE dataset 2005  
   VI
Table 6: Estimation results- Determinants of occupational pension plan provision 
























Personal attributes         
Income
5  -0.522***  -0.621***  0.00005***  0.00005*** 
  (-9.00)  (-3.95)  (3.42)  (3.39) 
Gender (male = 1)    0.075  0.082  0.075 
    (0.56)  (1.07)  (0.98) 
Marital status (married = 1)    -0.056  0.344***  0.342*** 
    (-0.34)  (3.80)  (3.78) 
Age    0.012(*)  0.114***  0.113*** 
    (1.43)  (5.21)  (5.14) 
Age
2      -0.001***  -0.001*** 
      (-5.66)  (-5.59) 
Education (university = 1)    0.139  -0.043  -0.058 
    (0.91)  (-0.40)  (-0.54) 
Region (Western Germany = 1)     0.292*  0.162*  0.171** 
    (1.72)  (1.82)  (1.92) 
Number of children      -0.087**  -0.076** 
      (-2.56)  (-2.24) 
Claims at earlier employer    0.342(*)     
    (1.49)     
Tenure    0.021**     
    (2.01)     
Line of business  
(dummy variables) 
       
Manufacturing  0.341***  -0.086     
  (5.88)  (-0.57)     
Financial Intermediaries  0.926***  0.409**     
  (6.76)  (1.98)     
Firm size  
(dummy variables) 
       
5 to < 20 employees  -0.642***  -0.574***     
  (-8.33)  (-2.37)     
2000 and more employees  0.698***  0.001     
  (11.65)  (0.01)     
Savings motives         
Life expectancy
6      0.223**  0.219** 
      (2.41)  (2.37) 
Unemployment risk
7    -0.029  -0.014  -0.013 
    (-0.25)  (-0.89)  (-0.78) 
Standard of living
8    0.036  0.044**  0.045** 
    (0.85)  (2.19)  (2.22) 
Economic situation
9    0.265***  0.065***  0.063*** 
    (2.52)  (3.25)  (3.17) 
Riester pension (yes = 1)      0.230**   
      (1.93)   
Other private pension (yes = 1)        0.235** 
        (2.18) 
Estimation method  Binary probit  Binary probit  Binary probit  Binary probit 
No. of observations  6200  1299  2229  2229 
Wald Test  462.56***  77.00***  139.39***  139.80*** 
Constant  -0.068  -0.049  -4.443***  -4.433*** 
 
1+2: based on GSOEP (1995), wave 12 
3+4: based on SAVE dataset wave 2005 
5: in 1995 measured as net household income, in 2005 measured as net household income computed by adding income 
of the head of the household to that of his or her partner’s income 
6: measured on a three-point rating scale: 1 = shorter than average, 2 = approx. average, 3 = longer than average   VII
7: in 1995 measured on a three-point rating scale of whether a person is worried about the security of his/her job (sub-
jective classification): 1 = not worried, 2 = slightly worried, 3 = very worried; in 2005 measured on a rating scale 
(subjective classification for year 2005 to become unemployed):  
  0% = totally unlikely,…, 100% = totally likely 
8: in 1995 measured on a rating scale (subjective classification of the present happiness with the own life as a whole):  
  0 = low, …, 10 = very happy ; in 2005 measured on a rating scale (subjective classification for year 2005 of being 
satisfied with the individual economic situation): 0 = totally unsatisfied, …, 10 = very satisfied 
9: in 1995 measured on a three-point rating scale of whether a person is worried about his/her own financial situation 
(subjective classification): 1 = not worried, 2 = slightly worried, 3 = very worried; in 2005 measured on a rating scale 
(subjective classification for the future on own economic situation): 
  0 = very negative, …, 10 = very positive  
10: results weighted by a person level projection factor 
11: weighted results are based on the distribution of income and age of the German sample census  
***, **, and * = significant on 1%, on 5%, on 10% level, z-values in parentheses 
Reference groups: line of business: people employed in agrarian, mining, construction, electricity, sale, hotels, restau-
rants, and others; firm size: less than 5 employees + 20 to < 2000 employees 
Source: own estimation, estimated with “Stata SE 9.2”   VIII
 
 
Table 7: Estimation Results - Determinants of pension plan entitlement duration 
 
  Model 5 
Dependent variable  Duration of entitlement (logarithm)
1; 2 
Personal attributes   
Net household income (logarithm)  -0.238* 
  (-1.54) 
Gender (male = 1)  0.292*** 
  (3.97) 
Marital status (married = 1)  0.265*** 
  (3.15) 
Age (logarithm)  1.61*** 
  (13.24) 
Education (university degree = 1)  -0.445*** 
  (-5.10) 
Employee status (blue collar = 1)  0.012 
  (0.14) 
Children (< 16 years = 1)  -0.142** 
  (-2.18) 
Line of business (dummy variables)   
Manufacturing  0.104 
  (1.33) 
Financial intermediaries  0.119 
  (1.19) 
Firm size (dummy variables)   
5 to < 20 employees  -0.415*** 
  (-2.79) 
2000 and more employees  0.183*** 
  (2.58) 
Savings motive   
Unemployment risk
4   -0.098* 
  (-1.81) 
Estimation method  OLS
3  
n  990 
F-Test  37.53*** 
R
2 (adjusted)  0.3430 
Constant  -4.004*** 
1: results weighted by a person level projection factor 
2: based on GSOEP (1995), wave 12 
3: White-heteroscedasticity-consistent OLS estimation  
4: measured on a three-point rating scale of whether a person is worried about the security of his/her job (subjective 
classification): 1 = not worried, 2 = slightly worried, 3 = very worried 
***, **, and * = significant on 1%, on 5%, on 10% level, t-values in parentheses,  
Reference groups: line of business: people employed in agrarian, mining, construction, electricity, sale, hotels, restau-
rants, and others; firm size: less than 5 employees + 20 to < 2000 employees 
Source: own estimation, estimated with “Stata 9.2 SE” 
   IX
 
 
Table 8: Mean tenure by line of business 
  tenure  Standard deviation 
Farming/agrarian  10.3  (9.7) 
Mining  11.4  (8.3) 
Manufacturing of goods  15.8  (10.0) 
Electricity  15.8  (11.6) 
Construction  11.6  (9.6) 
Sale, hotels, restaurants  13.0  (9.5) 
Financial intermediation  11.8  (9.8) 
others  11.8  (9.4) 
Source: own calculations based on GSOEP, wave 12 (1995) 
Note: table 8 includes the mean tenure of people who are entitled in an occupational pension plan, numbers are given in 
years, standard deviation in parentheses  
 